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We provide an empirical investigation of the channels via which the legal quality of bank 
regulation and supervision (RS) affects banking sector performance through its impact on 
depositor  and  borrower  behavior.  The  results  of  our  event  study  show  that  RS  has 
significant positive effects on deposits and investments and a significant negative effect 
on  non-performing  loans.  These  findings  remain  robust  to  the  addition  of  control 
variables.   
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1.   Introduction 
 
Legislation regarding bank regulation and supervision (RS) is a crucial formal institution 
for banking sector prudence. The extent of transparency, restrictiveness and the coverage 
of bank laws helps predict the adverse selection and moral hazard risks the banking sector 
faces.  This  paper  hypothesizes  that  RS  affects  banking  sector  performance  mainly 
through  three  channels.  First,  it  increases  the  deposit-to-GDP  ratio  by  promoting 
depositors’ trust in the banking sector. Second, it facilitates the banks’ abilities to channel 
funds  into  efficient  investment  projects  through  effective  balance-sheet  management, 
background checks and monitoring. Third, through effective supervision, RS increases 
the ratio of loans returned to banks.  
The  positive  relationship  between  trust  and  financial  market  development  has 
been evidenced in the works of Guiso et al. (2004) and Calderon et al. (2001).
1 We argue 
that RS helps build trust in the banking sector. In accordance, Allen and Gale (2007) and 
De  Haan  and  Shehzad  (2010)  argue  that  regulatory  intensity  reduces  banking  crises.  
Based on survey-based measures of bank regulation and supervision, however, Barth et 
al. (2005) argue that regulatory and supervisory intensity reduces banking efficiency.  
This paper uses the legal indices of RS provided by Neyapti and Dincer (2005) 
and Dincer and Neyapti (2008) to empirically investigate the effects of RS on banking 
sector performance. Based on an event study, we provide robust evidence that RS has 
significant positive effects on deposits and investment, and significant negative effects on 
non-performing loans. In what follows, Section 2 describes the data and methodology, 
Section 3 reports the estimation results and Section 4 concludes.  
   3 
2.  Data and Methodology 
Neyapti and Dincer  (2005) and Dincer and Neyapti (2008) measure RS based on 99  
criteria  covering  legal  provisions  regarding  capital  requirements,  lending,  ownership 
structure,  directors  and  managers,  reporting/recording  requirements,  corrective  action, 
supervision and deposit insurance. The RS index is available for 53 (24 transitional, 11 
developed and 18 developing) countries. 
To test the relationship between RS and depositor trust, we use the ratios of total 
and time deposits in GDP, denoted by DEPgdp and TDgdp. The dependent variables 
chosen to test the effects of RS on investment and borrower behavior are the ratios of 
investment  to  GDP  (INVgdp),  and  of  non-performing  loans  (NPL)  to  total  credits 
(NPLcr), respectively.  
The  data,  other  than  RS,  are  organized  in  five-year  averages  following  the 
enactment years of banking laws, which identify the events.
2 Due to data restrictions, 
however, NPLcr is estimated with the starting date of 2000. Using explanatory variables 
in five-year lags with respect to RS eliminates the potential simultaneity problems. For 
twelve countries in the sample, the time dimension of data is two due to re-enactment of 
banking laws. Hence, depending on the model estimated, the number of observations 
ranges between 34 and 61.
3 To control for possible cross-sectional heterogeneity, the 
White-heteroskedasticity correction is applied to the error terms.  
Table 1 reports the correlations between the components of RS and the banking 
performance indicators. Not surprisingly, deposit insurance attracts deposits, as shown in 
the positive correlations of 0.35 and 0.22 for DEPgdp and TDgdp, respectively. While 
DEPgdp  is  positively  correlated  with  capital  requirements  (0.41),  TDgdp  is  highly   4 
correlated  with  the  legal  provisions  regarding  supervision  (0.36),  indicating  that  the 
enforcement quality of banking laws improves depositor confidence in banks’ activities. 
Also  as  expected,  regulations  regarding  reporting-recording  requirements,  supervision 
and ownership are all highly negatively correlated with NPLcr (-0.50, -0.51 and -0.38, 
respectively). While regulatory provisions on bank lending is positively associated with 
investment (0.27), it is interesting that legal provisions on both capital requirements and 
director-manager qualifications are negatively associated with investment (-0.37). The 
negative relation is even more prevalent with regards to deposit insurance (-0.62). The 
empirical investigation below indicates, however, this observation may pertain to specific 
structural circumstances. 
 
Table 1: Correlations between the components of RS and bank performance. 
  DEPgdp  TDgdp  INVgdp  NPLcr 
     RS  0.30  0.26  -0.35  -0.33 
Capital req.  0.41  0.06  -0.37  -0.05 
Lending  0.33  0.11  0.27  0.02 
Ownership  0.17  0.12  -0.17  -0.38 
Directors-Manag.  0.19  -0.06  -0.38  -0.17 
Rep.-Recording  -0.27  0.18  0.04  -0.50 
Corrective Action  0.28  0.17  0.12  0.24 
Supervision  -0.21  0.36  -0.20  -0.51 
Dep.Insurance  0.35  0.22  -0.62  -0.07 
 
 
3.  Empirical Evidence  
Equations (1) to (3) present the basic models to investigate the relationships of deposits, 
investments and NPL with RS. The expected signs of the coefficient are reported below.  
In Equation (1), Dep stands for either DEPgdp or TDgdp; Sgdp and CRgdp stand    5 
 
Dep = f (RS, CRgdp, Sgdp, rDep)       (1) 
            +    +    +  +     
for the ratios of savings and total bank credits to GDP; and rDep is the real rate of interest 
on deposits. CRgdp controls for the level of financial market development.  
  Equation (2) models the relationship between RS and investment, where r is the 
real lending rate. As typical in investment regressions, GDPgr is used to control for the 
business cycles effects.  
 
      INVgdp = f (RS, GDPgr, r),        (2) 
                  +      +        -   
 
In Equation (3), R is expected to increase the moral hazard risk, and hence NPLcr, 
since  the  real  value  of  borrowed  funds  decreases  with  inflation,  which  affects  R 
positively.
4 
      NPLcr= f (RS, GDPgr, R)        (3) 
                                             -         -         + 
The robustness of the above basic specifications are tested by including additional control 
variables.  
As Table 2a shows, RS has significant positive effect on DEPgdp, which is, on 
average,  lower  in  transition  economies  (TE)  than  others.  The  addition  of  CRgdp, 
however, makes the effect of RS insignificant, indicating that developed financial markets 
ae already associated with high trust in the banking sector, this reduces the marginal 
effect of formal insitutions. Generally speaking, where market mechanisms are reinforced 
with developed business norms, formal mechanisms may add little to trust.   6 
Table 2: RS and depositor trust  
 
Table 2a. Dependent Variable: DEPgdp 
  I  II  III 
        Constant  0.70***  -0.21  -0.83 
  (5.53)  (-1.01)  (-1.45) 
RS  0.07***  -0.14  1.51 
  (3.01)  (-1.24)  (1.37) 
TE  -0.71***  0.46  1.12 
  (-4.44)  (1.12)  (1.45) 
RS*TE      -1.67 
      (-1.42) 
CRgdp    0.52***  0.46** 
    (2.68)  (2.15) 
Sgdp    2.29  2.70 
    (1.46)  (1.60) 
rDep      0.13 
      (1.04) 
No. of obs.  45  44  37 
R-bar
2  0.20  0.42  0.40 
 
 
Table 2b.  Dependent Variable: TDgdp 
  I  II  III 






RS  0.04*  -0.10  2.65* 
  (1.88)  (-1.44)  (1.72) 
TE  -0.65***  0.30  1.65* 
  (-2.83)  (1.21)  (1.71) 
RS*TE      -2.85* 
      (-1.74) 
CRgdp    0.77***  0.49 
    (3.14)  (1.40) 
Sgdp    1.41  3.06 
    (1.43)  (1.44) 
rDep      0.11 
      (0.72) 
No. of obs.  37  36  28 
R-bar
2  0.16  0.38  0.41 
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
   7 
Table 2b also shows a significant, although weaker, effect of RS on time deposits, 
measured  by  TDgdp.  RS  becomes  insignificant  when  CRgdp  is  added,  although  its 
significance recovers in the extended specification. The negative interaction term RS*TE 
reflects the inconsistency between formal institutions and norms in the initial stages of 
transition.
5 Addional interaction variables and governance quality
6 are introduced into the 
model, but not reported since they are either insignificant or not robust.  
 
3.2  RS and Borrower Behavior 
Table  3  shows  that,  along  with  GDPgr,  RS  is  significantly  positive  in  explaining 
investment, whereas r is negative as expected. In addition, investment is observed to be 
significantly lower in TEs than in the rest of the sample. These findings remain robust 
after  the  addition  of  various  other  variables  such  as  CRgdp  and  inflation,  which  are 
insignificant and hence not reported here. In addition, while controlling for governance 
(the  Freedom  House  Index:  FI)  leaves  the  findings  for  RS  virtually  unchanged,  its 
coefficient is not robustly significant and hence regressions involving this term are not 
reported.  
Does  RS  affect  the  ratio  of  credit  not  returned  to  banks?  The  answer  to  this 
question is affirmative based on the evidence provided in Table 4 that that shows that RS, 
governance  (gov)
7  and  R  all  have  significant  negative  effects  on  NPL.  While  the 
interaction between gov and RS is not significant, RS is significant for all possible values 
of gov.
8 These results remain robust after the addition of CRgdp, which is not significant 
itself and also does not improve the fit of the regression; hence those results are not 
reported.     8 
Table 3: RS and investment  
 
Dependent Variable: INVgdp 
  I  II  III 






RS  0.02***  0.02***  0.02*** 
  (6.83)  (6.51)  (2.20) 
TE  -0.09***  -0.07***  -0.09*** 
  (-5.55)  (-4.99)  (-2.03) 
GDPgr    0.27***  1.56*** 
    (2.74)  (3.71) 
r      -0.18* 
      (-1.70) 
       
No. of obs.  61  56  34 
R-bar
2  0.21  0.26  0.41 
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. 





Table 4: RS and non-performing loans  
 
Dependent Variable: NPLcr   
  I  II 




RS  -3.12***  -2.32*** 
  (-3.52)  (-2.58) 
gov  -26.20***  -28.75*** 
  (-8.45)  (-8.04) 
RS*gov  4.10***  2.97*** 
  (2.92)  (2.10) 
GDPgr  -0.05  -0.85 
  (-0.17)  (-0.13) 
R    -0.17*** 
    (-4.03) 
 
No. of obs.        39  33 
R-bar
2  0.53  0.58 
Notes: t-ratios are in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
   9 
  In addition to the above robustness checks, we controlled for the decade dummies 
in estimating deposits and investments so as to account for possible shifts in deposit and 
investment  behavior  over  time.  Those  dummies  are  usually  insignificant  and  their 





4.  Conclusion 
 
Banking laws are formal institutions that are expected to reduce the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems in the banking sector. This paper hypothesizes that legal intensity 
of bank regulation and supervision (RS) improves the banking sector performance by 
affecting depositor trust and borrower discipline. The empirical evidence supports these 
hypotheses strongly; RS exhibits a significant positive association with depositors’ trust 
as well as with investment and loan behavior. The results remain generally robust to the 
addition of other relevant variables such as the indicators of governance and financial 
market development and decade dummies.  
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1 Both Guiso et al.(2004) and Knack and Zack (2001) argue that social capital as well as legal enforcement 
are important in building trust. 
2 The data are obtained from the World Bank and the IMF. 
3 Because of at most two observations per country, the data can be regarded as cross-sectional. Based on 
Hausman (1978), the fixed-effects model is rejected, whereas the short and unbalanced time dimension 
does not allow the use of random effects.   
4 The negative effect of regulation on NPL is also reported by Guiso et al. (2007) for the case of Italy. 
5 Consistently, Neyapti and Dincer (2005) report that not the initial (one-size-fits-all type) but the latter 
enactments of baking laws (following the development of other market institutions) have significant 
positive effect on  TEs’ growth. 
6 The governance data of Kaufmann et al (2008) is not available for the period before 1996; instead we use 
the Freedom House Index of civil liberties. 
7A la Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
8 Based on Brambor et al. (2006) 
9 In estimating investment and deposits, the inclusion of dummies slightly weakens the results for RS, 
leaving the other results similar to the reported ones. These results are available from the authors upon 
request. 